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I shall argue that the commonly held V 6= L via maximize position,
which rejects the axiom of constructibility V = L on the basis that
it is restrictive, implicitly takes a stand in the pluralist debate in the
philosophy of set theory by presuming an absolute background concept
of ordinal. The argument appears to lose its force, in contrast, on an
upwardly extensible concept of set, in light of the various facts showing
that models of set theory generally have extensions to models of V = L
inside larger set-theoretic universes.
1. Introduction
Set theorists often argue against the axiom of constructibility V = L on the
basis that it is restrictive. Some argue that we have no reason to think that
every set should be constructible, or as Shelah puts it, “Why the hell should
it be true?” [19]. To suppose that every set is constructible is seen as an
artificial limitation on set-theoretic possibility, and perhaps it is a mistaken
principle generally to suppose that all structure is definable. Furthermore,
aThis article expands on an argument that I made during my talk at the Asian
Initiative for Infinity: Workshop on Infinity and Truth, held July 25–29, 2011 at
the Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore. This
work was undertaken during my subsequent visit at NYU in Summer and Fall,
2011, and completed when I returned to CUNY. My research has been sup-
ported in part by NSF grant DMS-0800762, PSC-CUNY grant 64732-00-42 and Si-
mons Foundation grant 209252. Commentary concerning this paper can be made at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/multiverse-perspective-on-constructibility.
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although V = L settles many set-theoretic questions, it seems so often to
settle them in the ‘wrong’ way, without the elegant smoothness and uni-
fying vision of competing theories, such as the situation of descriptive set
theory under V = L in comparison with that under projective determinacy.
As a result, the constructible universe becomes a pathological land of coun-
terexamples. That is bad news, but it could be overlooked, in my opinion,
were it not for the much worse related news that V = L is inconsistent
with all the strongest large cardinal axioms. The boundary between those
large cardinals that can exist in L and those that cannot is the threshold
of set-theoretic strength, the entryway to the upper realm of infinity. Since
the V = L hypothesis is inconsistent with the largest large cardinals, it
blocks access to that realm, and this is perceived as intolerably limiting.
This incompatibility, I believe, rather than any issue of definabilism or de-
scriptive set-theoretic consequentialism, is the source of the most strident
end-of-the-line deal-breaking objections to the axiom of constructibility. Set
theorists simply cannot accept an axiom that prevents access to their best
and strongest theories, the large cardinal hypotheses, which encapsulate
their dreams of what our set theory can achieve and express.
Maddy [14, 15] articulates the grounds that mathematicians often use in
reaching this conclusion, mentioning especially the maximize maxim, saying
“the view that V = L contradicts maximize is widespread,” citing Drake,
Moschovakis and Scott. Steel argues that “V = L is restrictive, in that
adopting it limits the interpretative power of our language.” He points out
that the large cardinal set theorist can still understand the V = L believer
by means of the translation ϕ 7→ ϕL, but “there is no translation in the
other direction” and that “adding V = L. . . just prevents us from asking as
many questions!” [20]. At bottom, the axiom of constructibility appears to
be incompatible with strength in our set theory, and since we would like to
study this strength, we reject the axiom.
Let me refer to this general line of reasoning as the V 6= L via maxi-
mize argument. The thesis of this article is that the V 6= L via maximize
argument relies on a singularist as opposed to pluralist stand on the ques-
tion whether there is an absolute background concept of ordinal, that is,
whether the ordinals can be viewed as forming a unique completed totality.
The argument, therefore, implicitly takes sides in the universe versus mul-
tiverse debate, and I shall argue that without that stand, the V 6= L via
maximize argument lacks force.
In [16], Maddy gives the V 6= L via maximize argument sturdier legs,
fleshing out a more detailed mathematical account of it, based on a method-
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ology of mathematical naturalism and using the idea that maximization
involves realizing more isomorphism types. She begins with the ‘crude ver-
sion’ of the argument:
The idea is simply this: there are things like 0♯ that are not in L.
And not only is 0♯ not in L; its existence implies the existence of
an isomorphism type that is not realized by anything in L.. . . So it
seems that ZFC+ V=L is restrictive because it rules out the extra
isomorphism types available from ZFC+ ∃0♯. [16]
For the full-blown argument, she introduces the concept of a ‘fair interpre-
tation’ of one theory in another and the idea of one theory maximizing over
another, leading eventually to a proposal of what it means for a theory to
be ‘restrictive’ (see the details in section 2), showing that ZFC+ V=L and
other theories are restrictive, as expected, in that sense.
My thesis in this article is that the general line of the V 6= L via maxi-
mize argument presumes that we have an absolute background concept of
ordinal, that the ordinals build up to form an absolute completed totality.
Of course, many set-theorists do take that stand, particularly set theorists
in the California school. The view that the ordinals form an absolute com-
pleted totality follows, of course, from the closely related view that there is
a unique absolute background concept of set, by which the sets accumulate
to form the entire set-theoretic universe V , in which every set-theoretic as-
sertion has a definitive final truth value. Martin essentially argues for the
equivalence of these two commitments in his categoricity argument [17],
where he argues for the uniqueness of the set-theoretic universe, an argu-
ment that is a modern-day version of Zermelo’s categoricity argument with
strong parallels in Isaacson’s [11]. Martin’s argument is founded on the
idea of an absolute unending well-ordered sequence of set-formation stages,
an ‘Absolute Infinity’ as with Cantor. Although Martin admits that ‘it is
of course possible to have doubts about the sharpness of the concept of
wellordering,” [17] , his argument presumes that the concept is sharp, just
as I claim the V 6= L via maximize argument does.
Let me briefly summarize the position I am defending in this article,
which I shall describe more fully section in 4. On the upwardly extensible
concept of set, one holds that any given concept of set or set-theoretic uni-
verse may always be extended to a much better one, with more sets and
larger ordinals. Perhaps the original universe even becomes a mere count-
able set in the extended universe. The ‘class of all ordinals’, on this view,
makes sense only relative to a particular set-theoretic universe, for there is
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no expectation that these extensions cohere or converge. This multiverse
perspective resonates with or even follows from a higher-order version of
the maximize principle, where we maximize not merely which sets exist,
but also which set-theoretic universes exist. Specifically, it would be lim-
iting for one set-theoretic universe to have all the ordinals, when we can
imagine another universe looking upon it as countable. Maximize thereby
leads us to expect that every set-theoretic universe should not only have
extensions, but extremely rich extensions, satisfying extremely strong the-
ories, with a full range of large cardinals. Meanwhile, I shall argue, the
mathematical results of section 3 lead naturally to the additional conclu-
sion that every set-theoretic universe should also have extensions satisfying
V = L. In particular, even if we have very strong large cardinal axioms in
our current set-theoretic universe V , there is a much larger universe V + in
which the former universe V is a countable transitive set and the axiom
of constructibility holds. This perspective, by accommodating both large
cardinals and V = L in the multiverse, appears to dissolve the principal
thrust of the V 6= L via maximize argument. The idea that V = L is per-
manently incompatible with large cardinals evaporates when we can have
large cardinals and reattain V = L in a larger domain. In this way, V = L
no longer seems restrictive, and the upward extensible concept of set reveals
how large cardinals and other strong theories, as well as V = L, may all be
pervasive as one moves up in the multiverse.
2. Some new problems with Maddy’s proposal
Although my main argument is concerned only with the general line of the
V 6= L via maximize position, rather than with Maddy’s much more specific
account of it in [16], before continuing with my main agument I would
nevertheless like to mention a few problems with that specific proposal.
To quickly summarize the details, she defines that a theory T shows ϕ is
an inner model if T proves that ϕ defines a transitive class satisfying every
instance of an axiom of ZFC, and either T proves every ordinal is in the
class, or T proves that there is an inaccessible cardinal κ, such that every
ordinal less than κ is in the class. Next, ϕ is a fair interpretation of T in T ′,
where T extends ZFC, if T ′ shows ϕ is an inner model and T ′ proves every
axiom of T for this inner model. A theory T ′ maximizes over T , if there
is a fair interpretation ϕ of T in T ′, and T ′ proves that this inner model
is not everything (let’s assume T ′ includes ZFC). The theory T ′ properly
maximizes over T if it maximizes over T , but not conversely. The theory
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T ′ strongly maximizes over T if the theories contradict one another, T ′
maximizes over T and no consistent extension T ′′ of T properly maximizes
over T ′. All of this culminates in her final proposal, which is to say that
a theory T is restrictive if and only if there is a consistent theory T ′ that
strongly maximizes over it.
Let me begin with a quibble concerning the syntactic form of her def-
inition of ‘shows ϕ is an inner model’, which in effect requires T to settle
the question of whether the inner model is to contain all ordinals or instead
merely all ordinals up to an inaccessible cardinal. That is, she requires that
either T proves that ϕ is in the first case or that T proves that ϕ is in the
second case, rather than the weaker requirement that T prove merely that
ϕ is in one of the two cases (so the distinction is between (T ⊢ A)∨ (T ⊢ B)
and T ⊢ A∨B). To illustrate how this distinction plays out in her proposal,
consider the theory Inacc = ZFC+‘there are unboundedly many inaccessi-
ble cardinals’ and the theory T = ZFC+‘either there is a Mahlo cardinal or
there are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals in L.’ (I shall assume
without further remark that these large cardinal theories and the others I
mention are consistent.) Every model of T has an inner model of Inacc, ei-
ther by truncating at the Mahlo cardinal, if there is one, or by going to L, if
there isn’t. Thus, we seem to have inner models of the form Maddy desires.
Unfortunately, however, this is not good enough, and I claim that Inacc is
actually not fairly interpreted in T . To see this, notice first that T does not
prove the existence of an inaccessible cardinal, since we can force over any
model of Inacc by destroying all inaccessible cardinals and thereby produce
a model of T having no inaccessible cardinals.b Consequently, if T shows ϕ
is an inner model, it cannot be because of the second clause, which requires
T to prove the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. Thus, T must prove ϕ
holds of all ordinals. But notice also that T does not prove that there are
unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals in L, since by truncation we can
easily have a Mahlo cardinal in L with no inaccessible cardinals above it.
So T also cannot prove that ϕ defines a proper class model of Inacc. Thus,
Inacc is not fairly interpreted in T , even though we might have wished it
to be. This issue can be addressed, of course, by modifying the definition
of shows-an-inner-model to subsume the disjunction under the provability
sign, that is, by requiring instead that T prove the disjunction that either
bFirst force ‘Ord is not Mahlo’ by adding a closed unbounded class C of non-inaccessible
cardinals—this forcing adds no new sets—and then perform Easton forcing to ensure
2γ = δ+ whenever γ is regular and δ is the next element of C.
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ϕ holds of all ordinals or that it holds of all ordinals up to an inaccessible
cardinal. But let me leave this issue; it does not affect my later comments.
My next objection is that the fairly-interpreted-in relation is not tran-
sitive, whereas our pre-reflective ideas for an interpreted-in relation would
call for it to be transitive. That is, I claim that it can happen that a first
theory has a fair interpretation in a second, which has a fair interpretation
in a third, but the first theory has no fair interpretation in the third. Here
is a specific example showing the lack of transitivity:
R = ZFC+ V=L+ there is no inaccessible cardinal
S = ZFC+ V=L+ there is an inaccessible cardinal
T = ZFC+ ω1 is inaccessible in L
The reader may easily verify that R has a fair interpretation in S by trun-
cating the universe at the first inaccessible cardinal, and S has a fair inter-
pretation in T by going to L. Furthermore, every model of S has forcing
extensions satisfying T , by the Le´vy collapse. Meanwhile, I claim that R
has no fair interpretation in T . The reason is that T is consistent with the
lack of inaccessible cardinals, and so if T shows ϕ is an inner model, then
in any model of T having no inaccessible cardinals, this inner model must
contain all the ordinals. In this case, in order for it to have Rϕ, the inner
model must be all of L, which according to T has an inaccessible cardinal,
and therefore doesn’t satisfy R after all. So R is not fairly interpreted in
T . The reader may construct many similar examples of intransitivity. The
essence here is that the first theory is fairly interpreted in the second only
by truncating, and the second is fairly interpreted in the third only by go-
ing to an inner model containing all the ordinals, but there is no way to
interpret the first in the third except by doing both, which is not allowed in
the definition if the truncation point is inaccessible only in the inner model
and not in the larger universe.
The same example shows that the maximizing-over relation also is not
transitive, since T maximizes over S and S maximizes over R, by the fair
interpretations mentioned above (note that these theories are mutually ex-
clusive), but T does not maximize over R, since R has no fair interpreta-
tion in T . Similarly, the reader may verify that the example shows that the
properly-maximizes-over and the strongly-maximizes-over relations also are
not transitive.
Let me turn now to give a few additional examples of what Maddy calls
a ‘false positive,’ a theory deemed formally restrictive, which we do not find
intuitively to be restrictive. As I see it, the main purpose of [16] is to give
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precise mathematical substance to the intuitive idea that some set theories
seem restrictive in a way that others do not. We view V = L and ‘there
is a largest inaccessible cardinal’ as limiting, while ‘there are unboundedly
many inaccessible cardinals’ seems open-ended and unrestrictive. Maddy
presents some false positives, including an example of Steel’s showing that
ZFC+‘there is a measurable cardinal’ is restrictive because it is strongly
maximized by the theory ZFC + 0† exists + ∀α < ω1 Lα[0†] 6|= ZFC. Lo¨we
points out that “this example can be generalized to at least every inter-
esting theory in large cardinal form extending ZFC. Thus, most theories
are restrictive in a formal sense,” [12] and he shows in [13] that ZFC it-
self is formally restrictive because it is maximized by the theory ZF+‘every
uncountable cardinal is singular’.
I would like to present examples of a different type, which involve what
I believe to be more attractive maximizing theories that seem to avoid
the counterarguments that have been made to the previous examples of
false positives. First, consider again the theory Inacc, asserting ZFC+‘there
are unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals’, a theory Maddy wants to
regard as not restrictive. Let T be the theory asserting ZFC+‘there are
unboundedly many inaccessible cardinals in L, but no worldly cardinals in
V .’ A cardinal κ is worldly when Vκ |= ZFC. Worldliness is a weakening of
inaccessibility, since every inaccessible cardinal is worldly and in fact a limit
of worldly cardinals; but meanwhile, worldly cardinals need not be regular,
and the regular worldly cardinals are exactly the inaccessible cardinals.
The worldly cardinals often serve as a substitute for inaccessible cardinals,
allowing one to weaken the large cardinal commitment of a hypothesis. For
example, one may carry out most uses of the Grothendieck universe axiom
in category theory by using mere worldly cardinals in place of inaccessible
cardinals. The theory T is equiconsistent with Inacc, since every model
of Inacc has a class forcing extension of T .c The theory Inacc has a fair
interpretation in T , by going to L, and as a result, T maximizes over Inacc.
Meanwhile, I claim that no strengthening of Inacc properly maximizes over
T . To see this, suppose that Inacc+ contains Inacc and shows ϕ is an inner
model M satisfying T . If M contains all the ordinals, then since Inacc
proves that the inaccessible cardinals are unbounded, M would have to
contain all those inaccessible cardinals, which would remain inaccessible
cOne first adds a closed unbounded class C of cardinals containing no worldly cardinals
(this forcing adds no new sets), and then performs Easton forcing so as to ensure that
2γ = δ+, where γ is regular and δ is the next element of C. The result is a model of T ,
since all worldly cardinals have been killed off.
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in M since inaccessibility is downward absolute, and therefore violate the
claim of T that there are no worldly cardinals. So by the definition of fair
interpretation, therefore, M would have to contain all the ordinals up to
an inaccessible cardinal κ. But in this case, a Loweheim-Skolem argument
shows that there is a closed unbounded set of γ < κ with VMγ ≺ V
M
κ , and
all such γ would be worldly cardinals in M , violating T . Thus, Inacc is
strongly maximized by T , and so Inacc is restrictive.
Let me improve the example to make it more attractive, provided that
we read Maddy’s definition of ‘fair interpretation’ in a way that I believe
she may have intended. The issue is that although Maddy refers to ‘trun-
cation. . . at inaccessible levels’ and her definition is typically described by
others using that phrase, nevertheless the particular way that she wrote her
definition does not actually ensure that the truncation occurs at an inac-
cessible level. Specifically, in the truncation case, she writes that T should
prove that there is an inaccessible cardinal κ for which ∀α(α < κ→ ϕ(α)).
But should this implication be a biconditional? Otherwise, of course, noth-
ing prevents ϕ from continuing past κ, and the definition would be more
accurately described as ‘truncation at, or somewhere above, an inaccessible
cardinal’. If one wants to allow truncation at non-inaccessible cardinals,
why should we bother to insist that the height should exceed some inac-
cessible cardinal? Replacing this implication with a biconditional would
indeed ensure that when the inner model arises by truncation, it does so by
truncating at an inaccessible cardinal level. So let us modify the reading of
‘fair interpretation’ so that truncation, if it occurs, does so at an inaccessi-
ble cardinal level. In this case, consider the theory Inacc as before, and let
MC
∗ be the theory ZFC+‘there is a measurable cardinal with no worldly
cardinals above it’. By truncating at a measurable cardinal, we produce a
model of Inacc, and so MC∗ offers a fair interpretation of Inacc, and con-
sequently MC∗ maximizes over Inacc. But no consistent strengthening of
Inacc can maximize over MC∗, since if V |= Inacc and W is an inner model
of V satisfying MC∗, then W cannot contain all the ordinals of V , since the
inaccessible cardinals would be worldly in W , and neither can the height
of W be inaccessible in V , since if κ = W ∩ Ord is inaccessible in V , then
by a Lowenheim-Skolem argument there must be a closed unbounded set of
γ < κ such that Wγ ≺ W , and this will cause unboundedly many worldly
cardinals in W , contrary to MC∗. Thus, on the modified definition of fair
interpretation, we conclude that MC∗ strongly maximizes over Inacc, and
so Inacc is restricted.
One may construct similar examples using the theory ZFC+‘there is
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a proper class of measurable cardinals’, which is strongly maximized by
SC
∗ = ZFC+‘there is a supercompact cardinal with no worldly cardinals
above it’. Truncating at the supercompact cardinal produces a model of
the former theory, but no strengthening of the former theory can show SC∗
in an inner model, since the unboundedly many measurable cardinals of the
former theory prevent the showing of any proper class model of SC∗, and
the eventual lack of worldly cardinals in SC∗ prevents it from being shown
in any truncation at an inaccessible level of any model of ZFC. A general
format for these examples would be ZFC+‘there is a proper class of large
cardinals of type LC’ and T = ZFC+‘there is an inaccessible limit of LC
cardinals, with no worldly cardinals above.’ Such examples work for any
large cardinal notion LC that implies worldliness, is absolute to truncations
at inaccessible levels and is consistent with a lack of worldly cardinals above.
Almost all (but not all) of the standard large cardinal notions have these
features.
Maddy has rejected some of the false positives on the grounds that
the strongly maximizing theory involved is a ‘dud’ theory, such as ZFC +
¬Con(ZFC). Are the theories above, MC∗ and SC∗, duds in this sense?
It seems hard to argue that they are. For various reasons, set theorists
often consider models of set theory with largest instances of large cardinals
and no large cardinals above, often obtaining such models by truncation,
in order to facilitate certain constructions. Indeed, the idea of truncating
the universe at an inaccessible cardinal level lies at the heart of Maddy’s
definitions. But much of the value of that idea is already obtained when one
truncates at the worldly cardinals instead. The theoryMC∗ can be obtained
from any model of measurable cardinal by truncating at the least worldly
cardinal above it, if there is one. But moreover, one needn’t truncate at
all: one can force MC∗ over any model with a measurable cardinal, by very
mild forcing. First, add a closed unbounded class C of cardinals containing
no worldly cardinal, and then perform Easton forcing so as to ensure in
the forcing extension that 2γ = δ+, whenever γ is regular and δ is the next
element of C above γ. The point is that this forcing will ensure that the
continuum function γ 7→ 2γ jumps over the former worldly cardinals, and so
they will no longer be worldly (and no new worldly cardinals are created).
If one starts this forcing above a measurable cardinal κ, then one preserves
that measurable cardinal while killing all the worldly cardinals above it.
(In the case of SC∗, one should first make the supercompact cardinal Laver
indestructible.) Because we can obtain MC∗ and SC∗ by moving from a
large cardinal model to a forcing extension, where all the previous context
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and strength seems still available, these theories do not seem to be duds in
any obvious way. Nevertheless, the theories MC∗ and SC∗ are restrictive,
of course, in the intuitive sense that Maddy’s project is concerned with.
But to object that these theories are duds on the grounds that they are
restrictive would be to give up the entire project; the point was to give
precise substance to our notion of ‘restrictive’, and it would beg the question
to define that a theory is restrictive if it is strongly maximized by a theory
that is not ‘restrictive.’
3. Several ways in which V=L is compatible with strength
In order to support my main thesis, I would like next to survey a series of
mathematical results, most of them a part of set-theoretic folklore, which
reveal various senses in which the axiom of constructibility V = L is com-
patible with strength in set theory, particularly if one has in mind the
possibility of moving from one universe of set theory to a much larger one.
First, there is the easy observation, expressed in observation 3.1, that
L and V satisfy the same consistency assertions. For any constructible
theory T in any language—and by a ‘constructible’ theory I mean just that
T ∈ L, which is true of any c.e. theory, such as ZFC plus any of the usual
large cardinal hypotheses—the constructible universe L and V agree on
the consistency of T because they have exactly the same proofs from T . It
follows from this, by the completeness theorem, that they also have models
of exactly the same constructible theories.
Observation 3.1: The constructible universe L and V agree on the con-
sistency of any constructible theory. They have models of the same con-
structible theories.
What this easy fact shows, therefore, is that while asserting V = L
we may continue to make all the same consistency assertions, such as
Con(ZFC+ ∃ measurable cardinal), with exactly the same confidence that
we might hope to do so in V , and we correspondingly find models of our
favorite strong theories inside L. Perhaps a skeptic worries that those mod-
els in L are somehow defective? Perhaps we find only ill-founded models of
our strong theory in L? Not at all, in light of the following theorem, a fact
that I found eye-opening when I first came to know it years ago.
Theorem 3.2: The constructible universe L and V have transitive models
of exactly the same constructible theories in the language of set theory.
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Proof: The assertion that a given theory T has a transitive model has
complexity Σ12(T ), in the form “there is a real coding a well founded struc-
ture satisfying T ,” and so it is absolute between L and V by the Shoenfield
absoluteness theorem, provided the theory itself is in L.
Consequently, one can have transitive models of extremely strong large
cardinal theories without ever leaving L. For example, if there is a transitive
model of the theory ZFC+“there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals,” then
there is such a transitive model inside L. The theorem has the following
interesting consequence.
Corollary 3.3: (Levy-Shoenfield absoluteness theorem) In particular, L
and V satisfy the same Σ1 sentences, with parameters hereditarily countable
in L. Indeed, LωL
1
and V satisfy the same such sentences.
Proof: Since L is a transitive class, it follows that L is a ∆0-elementary
substructure of V , and so Σ1 truth easily goes upward from L to V . Con-
versely, suppose V satisfies ∃xϕ(x, z), where ϕ is ∆0 and z is hereditarily
countable in L. Thus, V has a transitive model of the theory ∃xϕ(x, z),
together with the atomic diagram of the transitive closure z and a bijection
of it to ω. By observation 3.1, it follows that L has such a model as well.
But a transitive model of this theory in L implies that there really is an
x ∈ L with ϕ(x, z), as desired. Since the witness is countable in L, we find
the witness in LωL
1
.
One may conversely supply a direct proof of corollary 3.3 via the Shoen-
field absoluteness theorem and then view theorem 3.2 as the consequence,
because the assertion that there is a transitive model of a given theory in
L is Σ1 assertion about that theory.
I should like now to go further. Not only do L and V have transitive
models of the same strong theories, but what is more, any given model of
set theory can, in principle, be continued to a model of V = L. Consider
first the case of a countable transitive model 〈M,∈〉.
Theorem 3.4: Every countable transitive set is a countable transitive set
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in the well-founded part of an ω-model of V = L.
•
M
M
L
Proof: The statement is true inside L, since every countable transitive set
of L is an element of some countable Lα, which is transitive and satisfies
V = L. Further, the complexity of the assertion is Π12, since it asserts
that for every countable transitive set, there is another countable object
satisfying a certain arithmetic property in relation to it. Consequently, by
the Shoenfield absoluteness theorem, the statement is true.
Thus, every countable transitive set has an end-extension to a model of
V = L in which it is a set. In particular, if we have a countable transitive
model 〈M,∈〉 |= ZFC, and perhaps this is a model of some very strong
large cardinal theory, such as a proper class of supercompact cardinals,
then nevertheless there is a model 〈N,∈N 〉 |= V = L which has M as an
element, in such a way that the membership relation of ∈N agrees with ∈
on the members of M . This implies that the ordinals of N are well-founded
at least to the height ofM , and so not only is N an ω-model, but it is an ξ-
model where ξ = OrdM , and we may assume that the membership relation
∈N of N is the standard relation ∈ for sets of rank up to and far exceeding
ξ. Furthermore, we may additionally arrange that the model satisfies ZFC−,
or any desired finite fragment of ZFC, since this additional requirement is
achievable in L and the assertion that it is met still has complexity Π12.
If there are arbitrarily large λ < ωL1 with Lλ |= ZFC, a hypothesis that
follows from the existence of a single inaccessible cardinal (or merely from
an uncountable transitive model of ZF), then one can similarly obtain ZFC
in the desired end-extension.
A model of set theory is pointwise definable if every object in the model
is definable there without parameters. This implies V = HOD, since in fact
no ordinal parameters are required, and one should view it as an extremely
strong form of V = HOD, although the pointwise definability property,
since it implies that the model is countable, is not first-order expressible.
The main theorem of [10] is that every countable model of ZFC (and simi-
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larly for GBC) has a class forcing extension that is pointwise definable.
Theorem 3.5: If there are arbitrarily large λ < ωL1 with Lλ |= ZFC, then
every countable transitive set M is a countable transitive set inside a struc-
ture M+ that is a pointwise-definable model of ZFC+V=L, and M+ is well
founded as high in the countable ordinals as desired.
Proof: See [10] for further details. First, note that every real z in L is in a
pointwise definable Lα, since otherwise, the L-least counterexample z would
be definable in Lω1 and hence in the the Skolem hull of ∅ in Lω1 , which
collapses to a pointwise definable Lα in which z is definable, a contradiction.
For any such α, let Lλ |= ZFC have exactly α many smaller Lβ satisfying
ZFC, and so α and hence also z is definable in Lλ, whose Skolem hull of ∅
therefore collapses to a pointwise definable model of ZFC+V=L containing
z. So the conclusion of the theorem is true in L. Since the complexity of this
assertion is Π12, it is therefore absolute to V by the Shoenfield absoluteness
theorem.
Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 admit of some striking examples. Suppose for
instance that 0♯ exists. Considering it as a real, the argument shows that
0♯ exists inside a pointwise definable model of ZFC + V=L, well-founded
far beyond ωL1 . So we achieve the bizarre situation in which the true 0
♯ sits
unrecognized, yet definable, inside a model of V = L which is well-founded
a long way. For a second example, consider a forcing extension V [g] by the
forcing to collapse ω1 to ω. The generic filter g is coded by a real, and so in
V [g] there is a model M |= ZFC + V=L with g ∈ M and M well-founded
beyond ωV1 . The model M believes that the generic object g is actually
constructible, constructed at some (necessarily nonstandard) stage beyond
ωV1 . Surely these models are unusual.
The theme of these arguments goes back, of course, to an elegant the-
orem of Barwise, theorem 3.6, asserting that every countable model of ZF
has an end-extension to a model of ZFC+ V=L. In Barwise’s theorem, the
original model becomes merely a subset of the end-extension, rather than an
element of the end-extension as in theorems 3.4 and 3.5. By giving up on the
goal of making the original universe itself a set in the end-extension, Barwise
seeks only to make the elements of the original universe constructible in the
extension, and is thereby able to achieve the full theory of ZFC + V=L in
the end-extension, without the extra hypothesis as in theorem 3.5, which
cannot be omitted there. Another important difference is that Barwise’s
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theorem 3.6 also applies to nonstandard models.
Theorem 3.6: (Barwise [2]) Every countable model of ZF has an end-
extension to a model of ZFC+ V=L.
M
L
Let me briefly outline a proof in the case of a countable transitive model
M |= ZF. For such an M , let T be the theory ZFC plus the infinitary
assertions σa = ∀z (z ∈ aˇ ⇐⇒
∨
b∈a z = bˇ), for every a ∈ M , in the Lω1,ω
language of set theory with constant symbol aˇ for every element a ∈ M .
The σa assertions, which are expressible in L∞,ω logic in the sense of M ,
ensure that the models of T are precisely (up to isomorphism) the end-
extensions of M satisfying ZFC. What we seek, therefore, is a model of the
theory T + V=L. Suppose toward contradiction that there is none. I claim
consequently that there is a proof of a contradiction from T + V=L in the
infinitary deduction system for L∞,ω logic, with such infinitary rules as:
from σi for i ∈ I, deduce
∧
i σi. Furthermore, I claim that there is such a
proof inside M . Suppose not. Then M thinks that the theory T + V=L is
consistent in L∞,ω logic. We may therefore carry out a Henkin construction
over M by building a new theory T+ ⊆ M extending T + V=L, with
infinitely many new constant symbols, adding one new sentence at a time,
each involving only finitely many of the new constants, in such a way so
as to ensure that (i) the extension at each stage remains M -consistent; (ii)
T+ eventually includes any given L∞,ω sentence in M or its negation, for
sentences involving only finitely many of the new constants; (iii) T+ has
the Henkin property in that it contains ∃xϕ(x,~c) =⇒ ϕ(d,~c), where d is
a new constant symbol used expressly for this formula; and (iv) whenever a
disjunct
∨
i σi is in T
+, then also some particular σi is in T
+. We may build
such a T+ in ω many steps just as in the classical Henkin construction. If
N is the Henkin model derived from T+, then an inductive argument shows
that N satisfies every sentence in T+, and in particular, it is a model of
T +V=L, which contradicts our assumption that this theory had no model.
So there must be a proof of a contradiction from T +V=L in the deductive
system for L∞,ω logic inside M . Since the assertion that there is such a
proof is Σ1 assertion in the language of set theory, it follows by the Levy-
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Shoenfield theorem (corollary 3.3) that there is such a proof inside LM ,
and indeed, inside LMω1. This proof is a countable object in L
M and uses
the axioms σa only for a ∈ LMω1 . But L
M satisfies the theory T + V=L
and also σa for all such a and hence is a model of the theory from which
we had derived a contradiction. This violates soundness for the deduction
system, and so T + V=L has a model after all. Consequently, M has an
end-extension satisfying ZFC + V=L, as desired, and this completes the
proof.
We may attain a stronger theorem, where every a ∈M becomes count-
able in the end-extension model, simply by adding the assertions ‘aˇ is
countable’ to the theory T . The point is that ultimately the proof of a
contradiction exists inside LMω1 , and so the model L
M satisfies these addi-
tional assertions for the relevant a. Similarly, we may also arrange that the
end-extension model is pointwise definable, meaning that every element in
it is definable without parameters. This is accomplished by adding to T the
infinitary assertions ∀z
∨
ϕ ∀x(ϕ(x) ⇐⇒ x = z), taking the disjunct over
all first-order formulas ϕ. These assertions ensure that every z is defined by
a first-order formula, and the point is that the σa arising in the proof can
be taken not only from LM , but also from amongst the definable elements
of LM , since these constitute an elementary substructure of LM .
Remarkably, the theorem is true even for nonstandard models M, but
the proof above requires modification, since the infinitary deductions of M
may not be well-founded deductions, and this prevents the use of soundness
to achieve the final contradiction. (One can internalize the contradiction to
soundness, if M should happen to have an uncountable Lβ |= ZFC, or
even merely arbitrarily large such β below (ωL1 )
M .) To achieve the general
case, however, Barwise uses his compactness theorem [1] and the theory of
admissible covers to replace the ill-founded modelM with a closely related
admissible set in which one may find the desired well-founded deductions
and ultimately carry out an essentially similar argument. I refer the reader
to the accounts in [2] and in [3] .
It turns out, however, that one does not need this extra technology
in the case of an ω-nonstandard model M of ZF, and so let me ex-
plain this case. Suppose that M = 〈M,∈M〉 is an ω-nonstandard model
of ZF. Let T again be the theory ZFC + σa for a ∈ M , where again
σa = ∀z (z ∈ aˇ ⇐⇒
∨
b∈Ma z = bˇ). Suppose there is no model of T +V=L.
Consider the nonstandard theory ZFCM , which includes many nonstandard
formulas. By the reflection theorem, every finite collection of ZFC axioms
is true in arbitrarily large LMβ , and so by overspill there must be a non-
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standard finite theory ZFC∗ in M that includes every standard ZFC axiom
and which M believes to hold in some LMβ for some uncountable ordinal β
in M. Let T ∗ be the theory ZFC∗ plus all the σa for a ∈ M . This theory
is Σ1 definable in M, and I claim that M must have a proof of a contra-
diction from T ∗ + V=L in the infinitary logic LM∞,ω. If not, then the same
Henkin construction as above still works, working with nonstandard formu-
las inside M, and the corresponding Henkin model satisfies all the actual
(well-founded) assertions in T ∗+V=L, which includes all of T +V=L, con-
tradicting our preliminary assumption. SoM has a proof of a contradiction
from T ∗ + V=L. Since the assertion that there is such a proof is Σ1, we
again find a proof in LM and even in LMω1 . But we may now appeal to the
fact that M thinks LMβ is a model of ZFC
∗ plus σa for every a ∈ LMω1 , which
contradicts the soundness principle of the infinitary deduction system in-
side M . The point is that even though the deduction is nonstandard, this
doesn’t matter since we are applying soundness not externally but inside
M. The contradiction shows that T + V=L must have a model after all,
and soM has an end-extension satisfying ZFC+V=L, as desired. Further-
more, we may also ensure that every element of M becomes countable in
the end-extension as before.
Let me conclude this section by mentioning another sense in which every
countable model of set theory is compatible in principle with V = L.
Theorem 3.7: (Hamkins [6]) Every countable model of set theory
〈M,∈M 〉, including every transitive model, is isomorphic to a submodel
of its own constructible universe 〈LM ,∈M 〉. In other words, there is an
embedding j :M → LM , which is elementary for quantifier-free assertions.
LM
j
M x ∈ y ←→ j(x) ∈ j(y)
Another way to say this is that every countable model of set theory is
a submodel of a model isomorphic to LM . If we lived inside M , then by
adding new sets and elements, our universe could be transformed into a
copy of the constructible universe LM .
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4. An upwardly extensible concept of set
I would like now to explain how the mathematical facts identified in the
previous section weaken support for the V 6= L via maximize position,
particularly for those set theorists inclined toward a pluralist or multiverse
conception of the subject.
To my way of thinking, theorem 3.2 already provides serious resistance
to the V 6= L via maximize argument, even without the multiverse ideas I
shall subsequently discuss. The point is simply that much of the force and
content of large cardinal set theory, presumed lost under V = L, is never-
theless still provided when the large cardinal theory is undertaken merely
with countable transitive models, and theorem 3.2 shows that this can be
done while retaining V = L. We often regard a large cardinal argument or
construction as important—such as Baumgartner’s forcing of PFA over a
model with a supercompact cardinal—because it helps us to understand a
greater range for set-theoretic possibility. The fact that there is indeed an
enormous range of set-theoretic possibility is the central discovery of the
last half-century of set theory, and one wants a philosophical account of
the phenomenon. The large cardinal arguments enlarge us by revealing the
set-theoretic situations to which we might aspire. Because of the Baum-
gartner argument, for example, we may freely assert ZFC + PFA with the
same gusto and confidence that we had for ZFC plus a supercompact car-
dinal, and furthermore we gain detailed knowledge about how to transform
a universe of the latter theory to one of the former and how these worlds
are related.d Modifications of that construction are what led us to worlds
where MM holds and MM+ and so on. From this perspective, a large part
of the value of large cardinal argument is supplied already by our ability
to carry it out over a transitive model of ZFC, rather than over the full
universe V .
The observation that we gain genuine set-theoretic insights when work-
ing merely over countable transitive models is reinforced by the fact that
the move to countable transitive models is or at least was, for many set
theorists, a traditional part of the official procedure by which the forcing
technique was formalized. (Perhaps a more common contemporary view is
that this is an unnecessary pedagogical simplification, for one can formal-
ize forcing over V internally as a ZFC construction.) Another supporting
dThe converse question, however, whether we may transform models of PFA to models
of ZFC + ∃ supercompact cardinal, remains open. Many set theorists have conjectured
that these theories are equiconsistent.
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example is provided by the inner model hypothesis of [4], a maximality-
type principle whose very formalization seems to require one to think of
the universe as a toy model, for the axiom is stated about V as it exists as
a countable transitive model in a larger universe. In short, much of what
we hope to achieve with our strong set theories is already achieved merely
by having transitive models of those theories, and theorem 3.2 shows that
the existence of any and all such kind of transitive models is fully and
equally consistent with our retaining V = L. Because of this, the V 6= L
via maximize argument begins to lose its force.
Nearly every set theorist entertaining some strong set-theoretic hypoth-
esis ψ is generally also willing to entertain the hypothesis that ZFC + ψ
holds in a transitive model. To be sure, the move from a hypothesis ψ to
the assertion ‘there is a transitive model of ZFC + ψ’ is strictly increasing
in consistency strength, a definite step up, but a small step. Just as philo-
sophical logicians have often discussed the general principle that if you are
willing to assert a theory T , then you are also or should also be willing
to assert that ‘T is consistent,’ in set theory we have the similar principle,
that if you are willing to assert T , then you are or should be willing to
assert that ‘there is a transitive model of T ’. What is more, such a prin-
ciple amounts essentially to the mathematical content of the philosophical
reflection arguments, such as in [18], that are often used to justify large
cardinal axioms. As a result, one has a kind of translation that maps any
strong set-theoretic hypothesis ψ to an assertion ‘there is a transitive model
of ZFC + ψ’, which has the same explanatory force in terms of describing
the range of set-theoretic possibility, but which because of the theorems of
section 3 remains compatible with V = L.
This perspective appears to rebut Steel’s claims, mentioned in the open-
ing section of this article, that “there is no translation” from the large car-
dinal realm to the V = L context and that “adding V = L...prevents us
from asking as many questions.” Namely, the believer in V = L seems fully
able to converse meaningfully with any large cardinal set theorist, simply
by imagining that the large cardinal set theorist is currently living inside a
countable transitive model. By applying the translation
ψ 7−→ ‘there is a transitive model of ZFC+ ψ’,
the V = L believer steps up in strength above the large cardinal set theorist,
while retaining V = L and while remaining fully able to analyze and carry
out the large cardinal set theorist’s arguments and constructions inside that
transitive model. Furthermore, if the large cardinal set theorist believes in
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her axiom because of the philosophical reflection principle arguments, then
she agrees that set-theoretic truth is ultimately captured inside transitive
sets, and so ultimately she agrees with the step up that the V = L believer
made, to put the large cardinal theory inside a transitive set. This simply
reinforces the accuracy with which the V = L believer has captured the
situation.
Although the translation I am discussing is not a ‘fair interpretation’
in the technical sense of [16], as discussed in section 2, nevertheless it does
seem to me to be a fair interpretation in a sense that matters, because it
allows the V = L believer to understand and appreciate the large cardinal
set theorist’s arguments and constructions.
Let me now go a bit further. My claim is that on the multiverse view as I
describe it in [9] (see also [5, 8, 7]), the nature of the full outer multiverse of
V is revealed in part by the toy simulacrum of it that we find amongst the
countable models of set theory. For all we know, our current set-theoretic
universe V is merely a countable transitive set inside another much larger
universe V +, which looks upon V as a mere toy. And so when we can prove
that a certain behavior is pervasive in the toy multiverse of any model
of set theory, then we should expect to find this behavior also in the toy
multiverse of V +, which includes a meaningfully large part of the actual
multiverse of V . In this way, we come to learn about the full multiverse
of V by undertaking a general study of the toy model multiverses. Just
as every countable model has actual forcing extensions, we expect our full
universe to have actual forcing extensions; just as every countable model
can be end-extended to a model of V = L, we expect the full universe V
can be end-extended to a universe in which V = L holds; and so on. How
fortunate it is that the study of the connections between the countable
models of set theory is a purely mathematical activity that can be carried
out within our theory. This mathematical knowledge, such as the results
mentioned in section 3 or the results of [5], which show that the multiverse
axioms of [9] are true amongst the countable computably-saturated models
of set theory, in turn supports philosophical conclusions about the nature
of the full set-theoretic multiverse.
The principle that pervasive features of the toy multiverses are evidence
for the truth of those features in the full multiverse is a reflection principle
similar in kind to those that are often used to provide philosophical jus-
tification for large cardinals. Just as those reflection principles regard the
full universe V as fundamentally inaccessible, yet reflected in various much
smaller pieces of the universe, the principle here regards the full multiverse
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as fundamentally inaccessible, yet appearing in part locally as a toy mul-
tiverse within a given universe. So our knowledge of what happens in the
toy multiverses becomes evidence of what the full multiverse may be like.
Ultimately, the multiverse vision entails an upwardly extensible con-
cept of set, where any current set-theoretic universe may be extended to
a much larger, taller universe. The current universe becomes a countable
model inside a larger universe, which has still larger extensions, some with
large cardinals, some without, some with the continuum hypothesis, some
without, some with V = L and some without, in a series of further exten-
sions continuing longer than we can imagine. Models that seem to have 0♯
are extended to larger models where that version of 0♯ no longer works as
0♯, in light of the new ordinals. Any given set-theoretic situation is seen
as fundamentally compatible with V = L, if one is willing to make the
move to a better, taller universe. Every set, every universe of sets, becomes
both countable and constructible, if we wait long enough. Thus, the con-
structible universe L becomes a rewarder of the patient, revealing hidden
constructibility structure for any given mathematical object or universe, if
one should only extend the ordinals far enough beyond one’s current set-
theoretic universe. This perspective turns the V 6= L via maximize argu-
ment on its head, for by maximizing the ordinals, we seem able to recover
V = L as often as we like, extending our current universe to larger and
taller universes in diverse ways, attaining V = L and destroying it in an
on-again, off-again pattern, upward densely in the set-theoretic multiverse,
as the ordinals build eternally upward, eventually exceeding any particular
conception of them.
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